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Abstract
We generalize the potentials of Hart & Mas-Colell [1989] by intro-
ducing a class of linear potentials for TU-games based on an idea of
taxing and redistributing. To each potential an e¢ cient and additive
value is associated, which attributes to each player his linearly modi-
ed contribution to the potential of the grand coalition of a so-called
taxed game, plus an equal share in the tax revenues.
The class of linear-potential values includes egalitarian and dis-
counted Shapley values, but also weighted Shapley values. Using our
potential we show that the class of consistent values in the sense of Hart
& Mas-Colell [1989] can be extended. Furthermore, the Shapley fam-
ilyis enlarged by the classes of semi-egalitarian discounted weighted
Shapley values and equal-coalitional-improvement Shapley values.
We investigate connections between restrictions on linear-potential
values and axioms, some of which lose independence, e.g., variants of
standardness imply symmetry. We characterize several classes within
the Shapley familyby single axioms, such as symmetry and parameter
dependent forms of egalitarianism, consistency and standardness, as
well as individual members by forms of consistency and standardness.
JEL-codes: C71.
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1 Introduction
We introduce a generalization of the potential of Hart & Mas-Colell [1989].
To each transferable utility game1 (N; v) the (a; b; )-potential P a;b; at-
tributes a real number such that
0 = P a;b;(;; v);
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1A transferable utility game is an ordered pair (N; v) where N is the set of players,
and v is a map attributing to each coalition S  N a real number such that v(;) = 0:
1
v(N) =
P
i2N aiP
a;b;(N; v)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; v):
Here,  is a real number, a; b 2 RjZj are vectors2 of weights,each component
connected to a unique player in the set of possible players Z  N . The
right-hand side of the second equation adds up to v(N)  (1   )v(N),
i.e., the worth of (grand) coalition N for the -taxed game (N; v): Such a
game arises by raising a proportional tax of  on every coalition in (N; v).
To guarantee that the potential is well-dened and unique we require thatP
i2S ai 6= 0 for each nonempty S  Z:
We connect the linear-potential value  a;b; to the (a; b; )-potential as
follows. For all transferable utility games (N; v); and all i 2 N :
 a;b;i (N; v) = aiP
a;b;(N; v)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j :
So, each player gets his (linearly modied) marginal contribution to the
potential of the -taxed game and in addition to that an equal share in the
total tax revenues.
Joosten et al. [1994], Joosten [1996] showed that for xed ; the axioms
of e¢ ciency, symmetry, additivity and -egalitarianism uniquely determine
the -egalitarian Shapley value3, given by
Sh(N; v) = Sh(N; v) + (N; v1 ): (1)
The last axiom requires that a value attributes to each null-player in a game,
a fraction  of the per-capita income, cf., Joosten [1996]. Thus,  can be
interpreted as to reect a social norm, i.e., the level of egalitarianism or
solidarity in the society. Social norms on equality and solidarity exist in real
life, and one may wish to devise solutions incorporating them.4
Hart & Mas-Colell [1988,1989] characterize the Shapley value by con-
sistencyand standardness. A reduced game is a game on a subset of the
player set, that remains after paying o¤ all other players in the original
game in an appropriate way (which may vary with the solution in question).
Then, consistency requires that when a solution is applied to the reduced
game each player in the reduced game receives the same utility as in the
original one. Standardness implies that when the solution is applied to an
arbitrary two-person game, each player receives half of the surplus of that
game on top of the amount that he receives in the one-person coalition.
Hart & Mas-Colell [1989] extend this result to the entire family of weighted
Shapley values: Each weighted Shapley value is uniquely determined by
consistency and the amounts attributed in two-person games.
2Their interpretation is similar to the vector w for the weighted Shapley value. In fact,
Pw;w;0 is the potential of the w-weighted Shapley value of Hart & Mas-Colell [1989].
3The class of linear-potential values contains all -egalitarian Shapley values.
4E.g., Dutta & Ray [1989, 1991], Dutta [1990] and more explicitly Nowak & Radzik
[1994], Ju et al. [2004], Van den Brink & Funaki [2009], Malawski [2013].
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Another axiomatization of Sh in Joosten et al. [1994] follows Hart &
Mas-Colell [1989] using the axioms of -consistency and -standardness,
modications of the consistency and standardness. Van den Brink et al.
[2007,2013] show that consistency in the spirit of Sobolev [1973] may replace
-consistency to characterize each egalitarian Shapley value.
We investigate relations between restrictions on (a; b; ) and axioms used
to characterize Sh for the class of linear-potential values, but also connec-
tions among axioms. For instance, symmetry for  6= 1 restricts the class
of linear-potential values to those with a and b being vectors of constants,
implying -consistency in turn. The axiom of -egalitarianism for  6= 1
restricts the parameters to a = b. We show that  2 f0; 1g yields a class of
HM-consistent linear potential values putting no restrictions on a or b at all.
Moreover, for every linear-potential value satisfying  6= 0; 1; -standardness
implies -consistency. For this introduction this list will su¢ ce, but several
other implications regarding links with and between other axioms and pa-
rameters implied are to be presented in the remainder.
We distinguish certain subclasses of linear-potential values characterized
by single axioms: -egalitarian weighted Shapley values are characterized
by -egalitarianism, semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley values by symme-
try, and equal-coalitional-improvement Shapley values by -consistency. We
extend results of Joosten et al. [1994] and Van den Brink et al. [2007] by
deriving a characterization of special semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley
values by -standardness and either -consistency or Sobolov-consistency.
In Section 2 we introduce the model and present characterizations of
the (weighted) Shapley value(s) for the sake of comparison and easy refer-
ence. In Section 3, we dene and examine the families of (a; b; )-potentials
and values  a;b;: Section 4 treats -egalitarian Shapley values and char-
acterizations. Section 5 sheds light on the connections between parameters
(a; b; ) and axioms on one hand and the connections among axioms for
linear-potential values. Section 6 presents other axiomatizations of Shapley
family values. Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Let R denote the set of real numbers. Let Z be a nonempty set of natural
numbers, representing the set of potential players. (Strict) inclusions are
denoted by () . A coalition is a nite subset of Z. A transferable
utility game is a pair (N; v) where N  Z is a coalition and v : 2N ! R,
with v(;) = 0: The function v is the characteristic function. We denote
the set of all games with player set N by GN ; the set of all games is G.
Let (N; v) 2 G; then:
 for M  N , the characteristic function of the game (M;v) is the map
v restricted to 2M ;
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 the marginal contribution of i 2 S  N is given by vi (S) =
v(S)  v(Snfig);
 player i 2 N is a null-player (dummy-player) in (N; v) ifvi (S) = 0
(vi (S) = v(fig)) for all S  N;S 3 i; the set N (N; v) (D(N; v)) is
the set of null-players (dummy-players) in (N; v);
 player i 2 N is a nullifying-player (-reducing) in (N; v) if v(S) = 0
(v(S) = v(Snfig)) for all S  N;S 3 i;
 players i; j 2 N are symmetric in (N; v), if vi (S) = vj (S) for all
S  N;S  fi; jg:
Let v; w : 2N ! R; and ;  2 R; then:
 ((v + w))(S) = v(S) + w(S); for all S  N;
 (v)(S) = (1  )v(S) for all S  N .
With the rst operation GN is a linear space; the game (N; v) is the -
taxed game of (N; v); i.e., the game remaining after a proportional tax
of  is levied on the worth of each coalition in (N; v). So, v1 is equivalent
to the zero-game v0; i.e., N (N; v1) = N: For nonempty T  N  Z, the
T-unanimity game (N;uT ) is the game with uT (S) = 1 if T  S  N ,
and uT (S) = 0 otherwise.
Shapley [1953] demonstrated that the collection of all T -unanimity games
(; 6= T  N) constitutes a basis of the linear space GN . Hence, for every
game (N; v) with nonempty player-set N , there exists a unique set of num-
bers fcT 2 R j ; 6= T  Ng; satisfying v =
P
;6=TN cTuT where for given
T  N; cT =
P
;6=ST ( 1)jT j jSj v(S):
A value is a map  assigning to each game (N; v), a vector in RN .
The interpretation is that if the value is applied to a game (N; v); the i-th
component of the vector represents the utility attributed to player i 2 N in
the game (N; v). Let  be a value, then:
  is e¢ cient if Pi2N  i(N; v) = v(N) for every (N; v) 2 G;
  is symmetric if  i(N; v) =  j(N; v) whenever i; j 2 N are sym-
metric players in (N; v) 2 G;
  is linear if  (N;v + w) =  (N; v) +  (N;w) for all ;  2 R,
and all (N; v); (N;w) 2 G;  is additive if  (N; v + w) =  (N; v) +
 (N;w) for all (N; v); (N;w) 2 G;
  satises the null-player property if  i(N; v) = 0 whenever i 2
N (N; v);  satises the dummy-player property if  i(N; v) =
v(fig) whenever i 2 D(N; v);
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  satises the nullifying-player property if  i(N; v) = 0 when-
ever i is a nullifying player (Van den Brink [2007]);  satises the -
reducing-player property if  i(N; v) = 0 whenever i is a -reducing
player (Van den Brink & Funaki [2010]);
  is trivial if  i(N; v0) = 0 for all N  Z; i 2 N (Chun[1989]);
  is strongly monotonic if for any pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 G,
and any i 2 N; it holds that if vi (S)  wi (S) for all S  N; then
 i(N; v)   i(N;w) (Young [1985]);
  satises marginality if for any pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 G;
and any i 2 N; it holds that if vi (S) = wi (S) for all S  N; then
 i(N; v) =  i(N;w) (Young [1985]);
  is -standard if  i(fi; jg; v) = v(fi;jg) (1 )v(fjg)+(1 )v(fig)2 for all
2-person games (fi; jg; v) 2 G (Joosten et al. [1994], Yanovskaya &
Driessen [2001]).
An example of a value is the egalitarian value denoted by  in the sequel.
For arbitrary (N; v) 2 G, i(N; v) = v(N)jN j for all i 2 N: So,  distributes the
worth of the grand coalition equally among the players in all games. Hence,
 is e¢ cient, symmetric, additive, linear and trivial, 1-standard and satises
the nullifying property.
Another one is the Shapley value (cf., Shapley [1953], Roth [1988]),
Sh in the sequel. For every (N; v) 2 G and every i 2 N; Sh is given by
Shi(N; v) =
P
SN :i2S
(jSj 1)!(jN j jSj)!
jN j! 
v
i (S):
The Shapley value assigns to each player his average marginal contribution in
any game. The Shapley value is e¢ cient, symmetric, additive, linear, trivial,
and (0-)standard, moreover it satises strong monotonicity and marginality.
For linear values analysis may be simplied considerably, as  (N; v) =P
;6=TN  (N; cTuT ) for all linear values  and (N; v) 2 G:
An equivalent expression of the Shapley value is the following. For every
(N; v) 2 G, and every i 2 N;
Shi(N; v) =
P
TN :T3i
cT
jT j for all i 2 N;
where the numbers cT are given above. This may be seen immediately by
noting that in every game cTuT (; 6= T  N) all players in T receive cTjT j ; all
players outside T get zero. The Shapley value satises additivity, hence the
remark above justies this alternative expression.
Let w 2 RZ be a vector of exogenously given weights satisfying wi > 0
for all i 2 Z: Then, the weighted Shapley value (Shapley [1953]), denoted
by Shw in the sequel, is for every (N; v) 2 G given by
Shwi (N; v) =
P
TN :T3i cT

wiP
j2T wj

for all i 2 N:
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For w 2 RZ satisfying wi = wj > 0 for all i; j 2 Z, we have Shw = Sh.
Each weighted Shapley value satises the axioms of e¢ ciency, additivity and
the null-player property. It is characterized (up to a scalar multiple of w)
by these three axioms and the amounts which in all T -unanimity games,
; 6= T  N; are attributed to the members of T:
Symmetric players are not treated equally if wi 6= wj for some i; j 2 Z.
The following interpretation for asymmetric weights of the weighted Shap-
ley values is similar to the one given by Kalai & Samet [1987]. Suppose
players are to join in a project, and they can generate positive prots if they
all cooperate, and can generate zero-prots otherwise. Then, the Shapley
value gives each player an equal share of the prots. This seems reasonable
when players have to provide similar inputs. In case, however, that there is
an asymmetry in the e¤orts put forward by the players necessary to com-
plete the project, a symmetric division of the prots may not be reasonable.
Dividing the prots proportional to the e¤orts put forward by the players,
seems a good alternative. For this purpose, the weighted Shapley value may
be used with the weights equal to the e¤ort-levels.
2.1 Hart & Mas-Colell potentials and consistency
Hart & Mas-Colell [1989] introduce the following family of potentials.
Denition 1 (Hart & Mas-Colell [1989]) Let w 2 RZ satisfy wi > 0 for all
i 2 Z: Then the w-potential is the map Pw : G! R satisfying:
i. Pw(;; v) = 0 ;
ii.
P
i2N wi[P
w(N; v)  Pw(Nnfig; v)] = v(N) for every (N; v) 2 G:
So, a w-potential is a map attributing to each game a unique real number.
The condition of strict positivity on the vector of weights w guarantees that
the w-potential is well-dened and unique. The weighted Shapley value Shw
(Shapley [1953], Kalai & Samet [1987]) is connected to this w-potential as
follows (cf., Hart & Mas-Colell [1989]):
Shwi (N; v) = wi [P
w(N; v)  Pw(Nnfig; v)] for all (N; v) 2 G; i 2 N:
The w-potential provides an algorithm to compute the corresponding weight-
ed Shapley value Shw recursively by using:
Pw(S; v) =
v(S)+
P
k2S wkP
w(Snfkg;v)P
k2S wk
for all nonempty S  N:
For w = (1; :::; 1); we obtain the potential P and the Shapley value Sh.
Besides providing rather e¢ cient algorithms to compute weighted Shap-
ley values, w-potentials are useful in proving so called HM-consistency of a
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value as Hart & Mas-Colell [1989] have shown. Consistency is a reduced-
game property, which may be described as follows. Let  be a value. For
any group of players in a game, one denes a reduced game among them by
giving the rest of the players the payo¤s according to  . Then  is called
consistent if, when applied to any reduced game, it yields the same payo¤s
as in the original game. The following formalizes such a property.
Denition 2 (Hart & Mas-Colell [1989]) Let  be a value, (N; v) 2 G; and
; 6= U  N: Then the (U; )-reduced game of v is the game vU; satisfying:
i. vU; (S) = v(S [ U) Pk2U  k(S [ U; v) for all ; 6= S  NnU ;
ii. vU; (;) = 0:
Denition 3 (Hart & Mas-Colell [1989]) Let  be a value. Then  is
HM-consistent if for all games (N; v) 2 G and all ; 6= U  N :
 i(N nU ; vU; ) =  i(N ; v) for all i 2 N nU :
One can directly show with these denitions that the egalitarian value  is
HM-consistent. Other notions of consistency exist, each depending on its
own type of reduced game, cf., e.g., Driessen [1991], Yanovskaya [2003].
The following pertains to the utilities attributed by a value to the players
in two-person games.
Denition 4 (Hart & Mas-Colell [1989]) Let  be a value, let w 2 RZ
satisfy wi > 0 for all i 2 Z: Then  is w-proportional if for all 2-person
games (fi; jg; v); it holds that  i(fi; jg; v) = wiv(fi;jg) wiv(fjg)+wjv(fig)wi+wj :
If wi = c > 0 for all i 2 Z; w-proportionality is equivalent to (0-)standardness.
So, the weighted Shapley value with weights w, is w-proportional. Hart &
Mas-Colell [1989] prove the following axiomatic characterization.
Proposition 1 (Hart & Mas-Colell [1989]) Let  be a value, w 2 RZ sat-
isfying wi > 0 for all i 2 Z: Then, the following statements are equivalent:
i.  is HM-consistent and w-proportional;
ii.  = Shw:
3 Linear potentials and associated values
We now come to the central purpose of this paper: introducing a family of
potentials generalizing those of Hart & Mas-Colell [1989], and associate with
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each potential a unique e¢ cient and linear value. The families of potentials
and values to be introduced depend on a tuple of parameters (a; b; ): The
vectors a; b 2 RZ are exogenously given weights similar to the weights of the
weighted Shapley values. As before,  2 R is the level of taxation reecting
the norms on egalitarianism in the society.
Denition 5 Let a; b 2 RZ ;  2 R satisfy Pi2SZ;S 6=; ai 6= 0: Then the
(a; b; )-potential is the unique map P a;b; : G! R given by
i. Pa;b;(;; v) = 0 ;
ii.
P
i2N

aiP
a;b;(N; v)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; v)

= v(N); for all (N; v) 2
G; N 6= ;:
The linear-potential value  a;b; is for all (N; v) 2 G; i 2 N given by
 a;b;i (N; v) = aiP
a;b;(N; v)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j :
An interpretation of the value  a;b; is that for an arbitrary game (N; v) it
gives to player i 2 N the sum of the proportion  of the per-capita income
of the grand coalition, and his linearly modied marginal contribution to
the potential of the taxed game v; i.e., aiP a;b;(N; v)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; v):
As
P
i2S ai 6= 0 for all S  Z, the preceding denition implies
P a;b;(N; v) =
(1 )v(N)+Pk2N bkPa;b;(Nnfkg;v)P
k2N ak
;
which can be used to determine both the (a; b; )-potential and the con-
nected value recursively. Two instances of  have a rather special inuence.
For  = 0 taxing and redistributingbecomes void, whereas for  = 1 the
potential of each coalition is zero, which follows easily by recursion.
The following result may be proven straightforwardly and deals with
properties which hold universally for linear-potential values.
Lemma 2 For all admissible (a; b; ) ; the linear-potential value  a;b; is
e¢ cient, additive, linear, trivial, and homogeneous of degree 0 in (a; b).
Def. 5 allows unied representations of the (weighted) Shapley value, the
-egalitarian Shapley values (cf., Eq. 1) and the egalitarian value:
 If a = b = w; then P a;b;0 = Pw and  a;b;0 = Shw.
 If ai = bi = 1 for all i 2 Z; then P a;b;0 = P and  a;b;0 = Sh:
 If ai = bi = 1 for all i 2 Z; then P a;b; = (1  )P and  a;b; = Sh:
 If ai = 1; bi = 0 for all i 2 Z; then  a;b; (N; v) =  (N; v) :
 For arbitrary admissible a; b; we have  a;b;1 (N; v) = (N; v):
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4 -Egalitarian Shapley values
All weighted Shapley values satisfy the null-player property. So do several
others, e.g., the nucleolus (Schmeidler [1969]) and the  -value (Tijs [1981]).
Instead, we introduce the following axiom where  (N; v) =
P
j2N  j(N;v)
jN j is
the per-capita income under the value  in (N; v):
Denition 6 Let  2 R: The value  is -egalitarian if for every (N; v)
and i 2 N (N; v);  i(N; v) =  (N; v):
The axiom stipulates that utility received by a null-player in any game is
a xed scalar multiple (fraction)  of the per-capita income. Clearly, 0-
egalitarianism is equivalent to the null-player property. We dene the fol-
lowing family of values which satisfy this property.
Denition 7 Let  2 R; (N; v) 2 G; then the -egalitarian Shapley
value Sh is given by Sh(N; v) = Sh(N; v) + (N; v1 ):
Under Sh each player receives in a particular game the sum of the Shap-
ley value of the corresponding -taxed game and an equal share in the tax
revenues. Van den Brink et al. [2007,2013] use the term egalitarian Shap-
ley value only for convex combinations of Sh and . Casajus & Huettner
[2013] provide interesting characterizations, one pertaining to the subclass
for which   1; two others to the subclass for which  2 [0; 1].
Joosten et al. [1994] introduce social acceptability implying that null-
players in a unanimity game share in the worth of the grand coalition but
not to the extent that agents having marginal contributions which are at
least as high as the null-playersmarginal contribution get less than the
latter, see also Driessen & Radzik [2009]. This axiom restricts the range of
 to the unit interval.
Chameni Nembua & Demsou [2013] introduce ordinal equivalence: a
pair of values is ordinally equivalent, if the ordinal ranking of the utilities
under the values is the same for all possible games and players. The class of
ordinally equivalent -egalitarian Shapley value is characterized by  < 1.
Malawski [2013] introduces proceduralvalues. For the Shapley value
the following story is well known. Suppose all players enter a room one by
one, each receiving his marginal contribution to the coalition arising by his
entering. Then, after the last player has entered, the vector of the players
utilities is an e¢ cient division of the worth of the grand coalition, v(N). To
obtain the Shapley value, it is necessary to perform this procedure for each
and every sequence of the playersentering the room and then to determine
for each player the average of his utilities taken over all possible sequences.
For a proceduralvalue only one aspect changes, namely the amount each
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player may keep to himself upon entering. These amounts are predetermined
and depend on each players marginal contribution and on the order in which
the players enter. The egalitarian Shapley values and the solidarity value of
Nowak & Radzik [1994] are special instances of procedural values.
To continue our overview, we present two new axioms.
Denition 8 The value  satises equal coalitional improvement if for all
games (N; v); (N;w) and any nonempty coalition T  N with the property
i. w(S) = v(S) + c for some c 2 R; and all S  T ,
ii. w(S) = v(S) otherwise,
there exists some ec 2 R satisfying  i(N;w)   i(N; v) = ec for all i 2 T:
Suppose that a coalition ; 6= T  N has a gain such that the worths of
all coalitions containing T increase by the amount c. Then, the property of
equal coalitional improvement requires that all members of T improve by
an amount ec under the value. The Shapley value and the egalitarian value
satisfy equal coalitional improvement. So, an -egalitarian Shapley value
must also satisfy this property.
Denition 9 The value  satises -marginality if for all (N; v); (N;w) in
G and i 2 N; it holds that vi (S) = wi (S) for all S  N implies:
 i(N; v)   (N; v) =  i(N;w)   (N;w):
This property is an -dependent variant of the axiom of marginality intro-
duced by Young [1985]. The axiom of -marginality compares the utilities
attributed by a value in di¤erent games, requiring that if the vector of mar-
ginal contributions of a player is the same in two games, then the amounts
which he receives on top of the xed fraction  of the per-capita income in
the two games, are identical.
The following characterization uses the axioms of -egalitarianism, equal
coalitional improvement and -marginality. Part i. is the next of kin to a
characterization due to Shapley [1953], Part iii. relates to Young [1985].
Proposition 3 (Joosten [1996]) Let  2 R and let  be a value. Then, the
following statements are equivalent:
i.  satises e¢ ciency, additivity, symmetry, and -egalitarianism;
ii.  satises e¢ ciency, triviality, equal coalitional improvement, and -
marginality;
iii.  satises e¢ ciency, symmetry, and -marginality;
iv.  = Sh:
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4.1 Characterizations of Sh by forms of consistency
Here, results rely on generalizations of approaches by Hart & Mas-Colell
[1989] and Sobolov [1973]. First, we introduce the following reduced game.
Denition 10 Let (N; v) 2 G;  2 R; and let  be a value. For nonempty
U  N; the (U; ; )-reduced game (NnU; vU; ;) of v is given by
i. vU; ;(S) = v(S [ U) Pk2U  k(S [ U; v); if  = 1 and S 6= ;; or if
S = NnU ;
ii. vU; ;(S) = v(S [ U) Pk2U  k(S [ U; v) +

1 
h jU j
jSj+jU jv(S [ U) 
P
k2U  k(S [ U; v)
i
, if  6= 1; ; 6= S  NnU;
iii. vU; ;(;) = 0:
The interpretation is as follows. For any group of players in a game S 
NnU , one denes a reduced game among them by giving the rest of the play-
ers, i.e., U , the payo¤s according to  in the game (S[U; v). Then, the worth
of S is compensated for the group leaving with the amount
P
k2U  k(S [
U; v)by returning an amount 1 
h jU j
jSj+jU jv(S [ U) 
P
k2U  k(S [ U; v)
i
.
We now generalize HM-consistencyto an -dependent variant.
Denition 11 (Joosten et al. [1994]) Let  2 R. The value  is -
consistent if  i(NnU; vU; ;) =  i(N; v) for all (N; v) 2 G; all nonempty
U  N; and all i 2 NnU:
Van den Brink et al. [2007] use Sobolev-consistency in a characterization of
egalitarian Shapley values. We introduce this type of consistency next.
Denition 12 (Sobolev [1973]) Given (N; v) 2 G; player j 2 N; and
e¢ cient payo¤ vector x 2 Rn; i.e., Pi2N xi = v(N); the reduced game with
respect to j and x is the game (Nnfjg; vx) given by
vx (S)= jSjjN j 1 (v (S [ fjg)  xj)+ jN j 1 jSjjN j 1 v (S) for all S  N nfjg:
Considerations on the likelihood that coalition S[fjg forms versus the event
that j remains alone, motivate numbers jSjjN j 1 and
jN j 1 jSj
jN j 1 (cf., Van den
Brink et al. [2007]). With this reduced game, we dene consistency.
Denition 13 The value  satises Sobolev-consistency if and only if for
every (N; v) 2 G with jN j  2; j 2 N;  i
 
Nnfjg; v  =  i(N; v) for all
i 2 Nnfjg:
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It is easily veried that for xed  2 R; the value Sh satises -standardness.
We are now ready to present the following result, combining ndings of
Joosten et al. [1994] and Van den Brink et al. [2007].
Proposition 4 Let  2 R and let  be a value. Then, the following two
statements are equivalent:
i.  is -standard and -consistent;
ii.  satises -standardness and Sobolev-consistency;
iii.  = Sh.
5 Axioms and linear-potential values
Our goal here is to nd relationships between widely-used axioms and the
parameters (a; b; ). An additional aim is to reveal connections among the
axioms implied by restrictions on the parameters. We arrange our material
around four themes, each denes one subclass of linear-potential values.
5.1 -Egalitarianism
First, we present asymmetric generalizations of egalitarian Shapley values.
Denition 14 Let w 2 RZ satisfy Pi2S wi 6= 0 for every S  Z; and
let  2 R. The -egalitarian w-weighted Shapley value Shw; is for every
(N; v) 2 G given by Shw;(N; v) = Shw(N; v) + (N; v1 ):
We call the values obtained by taking all admissible w and  egalitarian
weighted Shapley values. Clearly, they form -dependent linear combinations
of the weighted Shapley value and the egalitarian value. Next, we show
connections between axioms and restrictions on the parameters.
Proposition 5  a;b;1 satises 1-egalitarianism and 1-marginality for arbi-
trary (admissible) (a; b). For  6= 1, the following statements are equivalent:
i.  a;b; satises -egalitarianism.
ii.  a;b; satises -marginality.
iii.  a;b; = Shw; with w = a = b:
Moreover,  a;b; satises -egalitarianism, implies  = :
Note that  appears both in the formulation of the linear-potential value
and the axioms. The nal statement stipulates that there can be at most
one instance for which a constant proportion to the null players for all games
with the same worth of the grand coalition is attributed by a linear-potential
value, namely exactly linked to the  in the tuple (a; b; ) :
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5.2 Symmetry
First, we recall a subclass of linear-potential values from Joosten et al. [1994]
to be seen as a symmetric generalization of the -egalitarian Shapley values.
Denition 15 For  2 R;  2 Rnf0g, the semi -egalitarian -discounted
Shapley value Sh is for all (N; v) 2 G; i 2 N given by (Sh )i (N; v) =
v(N)jN j + (1  )
P
SNnfig
jSj!(jN j jSj 1)!
jN j! 
jN j jSj 1 [v(S [ fig)  v(S)] :
We refer to the class of values obtained by taking all admissible  and ; as
semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley values. It can be conrmed that  = 0;
 = 1 yields the Shapley value, and for arbitrary  and  = 1, we obtain
the -egalitarian Shapley value. The term semi is used because Sh is not
-egalitarian for  6= 0: However, any null player in (N; v) receives v(N)jN j ,
so this establishes which players get v(N)jN j . Van den Brink & Funaki [2010]
call these players -reducing.
To give an elegant interpretation of these values, we present another no-
tion which is useful in the remainder.
Denition 16 Let  2 Rnf0g; then for (N; v) 2 G, the -discounted
game (N; v) is given by v(S) = jN j jSjv(S) for all S  N:
The names chosen are inspired by Driessen & Radzik [2002] who coined the
term of -discounted Shapley values for the special instance that  = 0.
Also the following interpretation related to discounting for  2 (0; 1) is
given: ...the worth of a coalition in an n-person game is weakly discounted
whenever the size s of the coalition is relatively large (or strongly discounted,
if the size of the coalition is relatively small) in comparison with the size n
of the player set.
Any -discounted Shapley value of the game (N; v) 2 G is equivalent to
the Shapley value of the -discounted game (N; v) 2 G: The reader may
conrm this by applying the Shapley value to the game (N; v) followed by
substituting v(S) = jN j jSjv(S) for all S  N . Similarly, the -egalitarian
-discounted Shapley value of the game (N; v) is the -egalitarian Shapley
value applied to the -discounted game (N; v). The following result links
the linear-potential value of a game to the one of a discounted game.
Lemma 6 For all (N; v) 2 G;  2 Rnf0g;  a;b;(N; v) =  a;b;(N; v):
In what follows, we use a notational convenience by writing   dened by
  (N; v) =  (N; v) for every (N; v) and value  with the customary re-
striction  6= 0. Next, we show connections between restrictions on the pa-
rameters (a; b; ) and the axiom of symmetry. It uses the preceding lemma.
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Proposition 7 The linear-potential value  a;b;1 is symmetric, for linear-
potential values  a;b; with  6= 1; the following statements are equivalent:
i.  a;b; is symmetric;
ii.  a;b; = Sh2
1
with ai = 1 6= 0; bi = 2 for all i 2 Z:
5.3 HM-consistency and standardness
Recall that -consistency and HM-consistency coincide for  2 f0; 1g: This
does not necessarily imply that for instance every linear-potential value  a;b;0
satises HM-consistency. The following establishes this however.
Proposition 8 For  = 0 or  = 1; the linear-potential value  a;b; is
HM-consistent:
So, for all a; b 2 RZ we have HM-consistency whenever  = 0 or  = 1:
This means that even the rather large class of weighted Shapley values form
merely a subclass of the HM-consistent linear-potential values.
The axiom of -standardness stipulates the utilities players in each 2-
person game receive depending on the real number  and the worths of the
two-person grand coalition and the two stand alonecoalitions. The axiom
has the following implications.
Proposition 9  a;b;1 satises 1-standardness. For  6= 1; the following
statements are equivalent:
i.  a;b; satises -standardness;
ii.  a;b; = Sh1 
1 
:
5.4 Equal coalitional improvement
We now introduce linear-potential values forming in some sense a class of
hybrids between egalitarian Shapley values and egalitarian weighted Shap-
ley values. The former are symmetric, the latter are not.
Denition 17 Let w 2 RZ satisfy Pi2S wi 6= 0 for every S  Z; and let
 2 R, then the ECI(w;)-Shapley value Shw;ECI is given by 
Shw;ECI

i
(N; v) = Pw;ECI(N; v)  wiPw;ECI(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j ;
where Pw;ECI = P
a; w;(N; v) and ai =  for all i 2 Z:
ECI is mnemonic for equal coalitional improvement, and we will refer to this
class as ECI-Shapley values. Observe that equal coalitional improvement is
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implied by symmetry, but not vice versa. Therefore, the class just presented
contains all semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley values. The following result
establishes the relation between this axiom and the parameters (a; b; ) :
Proposition 10  a;b;1 satises equal coalitional improvement. For  6=
0; 1; the following statements are equivalent:
i.  a;b; satises equal coalitional improvement;
ii.  a;b; = Shw;ECI :
iii.  a;b; is -consistent.
Note that each ECI-Shapley value satises this axiom. The converse state-
ment is obviously not true.
Figure 1 visualizes results of this section. Generalizations of standardness
are very restrictive and in fact imply -consistency for any value  a;b; with
 6= 0; 1: In other words, the egalitarian Shapley values are characterized by
-standardness and the fact that they admit5 an (a; b; )-potential.
Corollary 11 A linear-potential value  a;b;;  6= 0; 1; satises
 -egalitarianism if and only if it is an -egalitarian weighted Shapley
value.
 symmetry if and only if it is an egalitarian discounted Shapley value.
 -consistency if and only if it is an ECI-Shapley value.
 -standardness if and only if it is an -egalitarian Shapley value
6 Further characterizations of the Shapley family
Here, we characterize certain semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley values.
Proposition 12 The following statements are equivalent for ;  6= 1:
i.  a;b; is -consistent and -standard;
ii.  a;b; is Sobolev-consistent and -standard;
iii.  a;b; = Sh1 
1 
:
5This expression was coined by Calvo & Santos [1997], cf., e.g., Driessen & Calvo [2001].
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equal coalitional improvement
 -consistency
a=b
   symmetry
 -egalitarianism
 -standardness
 -standardness
 -marginality
Figure 1: Arrows imply implications. These connections apply to all linear-
potential values  a;b; satisfying  6= 0; 1. Note furthermore that  6= :
Now, we use another implication of Lemma 6. Observe that applying the -
egalitarian weighted Shapley value to the game (N; v) yields another value
for (N; v): The specics are given by the following.
Denition 18 Given w 2 RZ satisfying Pi2S wi 6= 0 for every S  Z;
 2 R; and  6= 0; the semi -egalitarian -discounted w-weighted Shapley
value for all (N; v) and all i 2 N is given by 
Shw;

i
(N; v) = wi

Pw; (N; v)  Pw; (Nnfig; v)

+ v(N)jN j ;
where Pw; = P
w;w;.
Again, we use the phrase semi, because Shw; gives 
v(N)
jN j to -reducing
players. Recall that a = b = w induces Shw;, here b = a = w induces its
-discounted next of kin, Shw; .
Denition 19 Let w 2 Rz satisfy wi > 0 for all i 2 Z; and let  2 R:
Then, the value  is (w ; )-proportional if for all 2-person games (fi; jg; v);
it holds that  i(fi; jg; v) = wiv(fi;jg) (1 )wiv(fjg)+(1 )wjv(fig)wi+wj :
This notion extends w-proportionality straightforwardly as the latter is a
special case of the rst. The next result shows that HM-consistency and
(w; )-proportionality characterize another member of the Shapley family.
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Proposition 13 The following statements are equivalent:
i. The value  is HM-consistent and (w; )-proportional;
ii.  = Shw;01 :
Corollary 14 Let  6= 1, a value  is
 HM-consistent and -standard if and only if  = Sh1 ;
 -consistent and standard if and only if  = Sh1
1 
;
 HM-consistent and (w;)-proportional if and only if  = Shw1 .
The following visualization shows connections within the Shapley family.
Each arrow denotes a restriction on the parameters as indicated.
Sh
=0   Sh
=1
.
=1
.
-
w=c1
-
w=c1
Sh
=0   Sh Shw
=0   Shw;
-
w=c1
=1
.
-
w=c1
=1
.
Shw
=0   Shw;
7 Conclusions and discussion
We introduced a class of potentials and associated to each potential a value.
This class of linear-potential values contains the Shapley value and the egal-
itarian value as special examples. Furthermore, the classes of the weighted
Shapley values (Shapley [1953], Kalai & Samet [1987]), the (-)egalitarian
Shapley values (cf., Joosten [1996],Van den Brink et al. [2007]), and the dis-
counted Shapley values (cf., Joosten et al. [1994], Joosten [1996], Yanovskaya
& Driessen [2001]) are contained by it.
Other approaches use similar ideas and we discuss some di¤erences now.
Naumova [2005] presents a class of consistent (possibly asymmetric) values
each originating from a potential as well. Her class of values intersects
clearly with ours, as weighted Shapley values are contained by both, but
it is easy to nd values belonging to Naumovas class and not ours (e.g.,
the proportional value of Ortmann [2000]), or vice versa (e.g., discounted
Shapley values, -egalitarian Shapley values).
Our approach should not be confused with the one of Driessen & Radzik
[2002] and related work (e.g., Feng [2013]) who dene, connected to se-
quences of reals N; N; N and a potential P
N;N;N , a value as a weighted
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pseudo-gradient, i.e., a vector of marginal contributions to PN;N;N . The
sequences are not connected to the players, but to the cardinality of the
player set for a particular game. Hence, asymmetric weighted Shapley val-
ues can not be written as a weighted pseudo-potential of the HM-potential.
The class of values implied by Driessen & Radzik [2002] contains discounted
Shapley values and the solidarity value. The former are a subclass of our
linear-potential values, the latter is not.
Van den Brink & Van der Laan [2007] dene a -potential and a function
giving each player a share in the worth of the grand coalition.6 Admittedly,
taking  (N; v) = v(N) for all (N; v) 2 G; yields P v i.e., the potential of
the -egalitarian Shapley value. However, the vector
(N; v) =
 
P v

(N; v)  P v(Nnf1g; v); :::; P v(N; v)  P v(Nnfng; v) ;
is projected unto the e¢ cient n-dimensional hyperplane di¤erently. We
project (N; v) orthogonally, whereas Van den Brink & Van der Laan [2007]
do so along the ray connecting (0; :::; 0) and  (N; v) : So, the latter yields
the Shapley value for all  6= 1 and the egalitarian value for  = 1, and ours
yields a unique value Sh(v) for each  6= 1.
We investigated connections between several axioms used for character-
ization of values and restrictions on the parameter set (a; b; ) determining
both the potential P a;b; and its associated linear-potential value  a;b;. It
should be noted that by construction linear-potential values satisfy e¢ ciency,
additivity, linearity and triviality.
We focused on axioms used to characterize the (-egalitarian) Shapley
value(s), cf., Joosten et al. [1994]. For linear-potential values, we found
the axiom of -egalitarianism to be equivalent to -marginality, a variant
of marginality (cf., Young [1985]); we found any symmetric linear-potential
value to satisfy -consistency, the latter being equivalent to equal coalitional
improvement for this entire class of values. For given (a; b; ), we showed
that the axiom of -standardness implies symmetry for  6= , and for
 =  it also implies -egalitarianism; therefore any linear-potential value
satisfying -standardness is an -egalitarian Shapley value.
We distinguished within the class of linear-potential values certain sub-
classes characterized by single axioms: -egalitarian weighted Shapley values
are characterized by -egalitarianism, semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley
values by symmetry, and equal-coalitional-improvement Shapley values by
-consistency. We derive a characterization of each value in a subclass of
the semi-egalitarian discounted Shapley values by -standardness and ei-
ther -consistency or Sobolov-consistency, extending results of Joosten et
al. [1994] and Van den Brink et al. [2007].
6 is a real-valued function depending on the number of players and the characteristic
function of an arbitrary game. The Shapley value and the egalitarian value can be formu-
lated in terms of such a potential and share function, by simply taking  (N; v) = v(N)
respectively  (N; v) = 0 for all (N; v) 2 G
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5: We only prove the part for  6= 1: (iii) implies
(i): We rst prove P a;a;(N; v) = P a;a;(Nnfig; v) whenever i 2 N (N; v);
by induction on jN j:
If N = fig; the statement holds trivially. Now, let jN j  2; and assume for
all games (S; v) with jSj < jN j that P a;a;(S; v) = P a;a;(Snfig; v) whenever
i 2 N (S; v): Then,P
k2N akP
a;a;(N; v) = (1  )v(N) +Pk2N akP a;a;(Nnfkg; v)
= (1  )v(Nnfig) +Pk2Nnfig akP a;a;(Nnfi; kg; v)
+aiP
a;a;(Nnfig; v)
=
P
k2Nnfig akP
a;a;(Nnfig; v) + aiP a;a;(Nnfig; v)
=
P
k2N akP
a;a;(Nnfig; v):
Hence, P a;a;(N; v) = P a;a;(Nnfig; v): The second equality follows from the
induction assumption. This in turn implies:  a;a;i (N; v) = aiP
a;a;(N; v) 
aiP
a;a;(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j = v(N)jN j whenever i 2 N (N; v).
(i) implies (iii): Let i; j 2 Z, -egalitarianism of  a;b; implies
0 = aiP
a;b;(fi; jg; ufjg)  biP a;b;(fjg; ufjg)
= (1  )

ai
1+bi
1
aj
ai+aj
  bi 1aj

= (1  )
"
ai+bi
ai
aj
 bi aiaj  bi
aj
aj
ai+aj
#
= (1  )
h
ai bi
ai+aj
i
:
Hence, ai = bi: This in turn implies a = b:
(iii) implies (ii): Take i 2 Z: Take (N;w) and (N; ew) with i 2 N and
wi (S) = 
ew
i (S): Observe that i 2 N (N; ew   w); and the part (iii) implies
(i)imply  a;a;(N; ew   w) = ( ew w)(N)jN j = a;a;(N; ew)   a;a;(N;w):
By linearity of  a;a; we have for
 a;a;i (N; ew) =  a;a;i (N; ew   w + w) =  a;a;i (N; ew   w) +  a;a;i (N;w)
=  a;a;i (N;w)   a;a;(N;w) +  a;a;(N; ew):
This proves -marginality of  a;a;:
(ii) implies (iii): Take i 2 Z; N 3 i; (N; v0); and (N;uNnfig): Then, by
-marginality
 a;b;i (N; v0)   a;b;(N; v0) =  a;b;i (N;uNnfig)   a;b;(N;uNnfig);
and by e¢ ciency and triviality we get  a;b;i (N;uNnfig) =

jN j : This implies
in turn that aiP a;b;(N;uNnfig)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; uNnfig) = 0; so:
0 = aiP
a;b;(N;uNnfig)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; uNnfig)
= (1  )
"
ai
1+bi
1P
k2Nnfig akP
k2N ak
  bi 1P
k2Nnfig ak
#
= (1  )ai
P
k2Nnfig ak+aibi bi
P
k2N akP
k2N ak(
P
k2Nnfig ak)
= (1  ) ai biP
k2N ak
:
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Hence, ai = bi: This proves a = b: So, these three statements are equivalent.
To prove the moreoverpart, suppose that  a;b; is -egalitarian and  6= 
and  6= 1: Then, it is a matter of calculation to establish that
 a;b;j
 fi; jg; ufig = 1 ai+aj [aj   bj ] + 2 = 2 for all i; j 2 Z:
However, we must have  a;b;j
 fi; kg; ufig = 1 ai+ak [aj   bj ]+ 2 = 2 as well,
hence aj = ak for all j; k 2 Z: But then, substituting a for ai and aj ; we
have  a;b;j
 fi; jg; ufig = 1 2a [a  bj ] + 2 = 2 : This implies bj = 1 1 a,
which in turn must hold for arbitrary j 2 Z: Next, consider  fi; j; kg; ufig
with i; j; k 2 Z arbitrarily chosen, but i 6= j 6= k 6= i: Then,
 a;b;j
 fi; j; kg; ufig = 13   1 6(1 ) [2    ] = 3 :
Hence, 1 6(1 ) [2    ] = 1 3 which is equivalent to 2   = 2 (1  ) :
This yields a contradiction. So,  a;b; is -egalitarian implies that  = :
Proof of Lemma 6: For S  N; we show P a;b;(S; v) = 1
jNj jSj
P a;b;(S; v)
by induction on the cardinality of the player sets S0  S: Observe that
P a;b;(fig; v) = (1 )v(fig)ai = 1jNj 1
(1 )jNj 1jv(fig)
ai
= 1
jNj 1
(1 )v(fig)
ai
= 1
jNj 1
P a;b;(fig; v):
Assume: P a;b;(S0; v) = 1
jNj jS0j
P a;b;(N; v) for all S0  S with jS0j < jSj:
Then,
P a;b;(S; v) = (1 )v(S)+
P
k2S bkPa;b;(Snfkg;v)P
k2S ak
=
(1 ) 1
jNj jSj v(S)+
P
k2S  1jNj jSj+1 bkP
a;b;(Snfkg;v)P
k2S ak
= 1
jNj jSj
(1 )v(S)+
P
k2S bkP
a;b;(Snfkg;v)P
k2S ak
= 1
jNj jSj
P a;b;(S; v):
The second equality follows from the induction assumption and the denition
of the discounted game v . Hence, we have
 a;b;(N; v) = aiP a;b;(N; v)    biP a;b;(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j
= aiP
a;b;(N; v)    1 biP a;b;(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j
= aiP
a;b;(N; v)  biP a;b;(Nnfig; v) + v(N)jN j
=  a;b;(N; v):
Proof of Proposition 7: We prove the part for  6= 1:(ii) implies (i):
Straightforward. (i) implies (ii): Take i; j 2 Z; then by symmetry of  a;b;
0 =  a;b;i (fi; jg; ufi;jg)   a;b;j (fi; jg; ufi;jg)
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= aiP
a;b;(fi; jg; ufi;jg)  biP a;b;(fjg; ufi;jg) + ufi;jg(fi;jg)2  h
ajP
a;b;(fi; jg; ufi;jg)  bjP a;b;(fig; ufi;jg) + ufi;jg(fi;jg)2
i
= (ai   aj)P a;b;(fi; jg; ufi;jg):
Since P a;b;(fi; jg; ufi;jg) 6= 0; we obtain ai = aj : So take 1 such that
1 = ai for all i 2 Z: Take (fi; jg; v) with v(fig) = v(fjg) 6= 0: Then, by
symmetry of  a;b;
0 =  a;b;i (fi; jg; v)   a;b;j (fi; jg; v)
= 1P
a;b;(fi; jg; v)  biP a;b;(fjg; v) + v(fi;jg)2  h
1P
a;b;(fi; jg; v)  bjP a;b;(fig; v) + v(fi;jg)2
i
=  biP a;b;(fjg; v) + bjP a;b;(fig; v)
=  bi (1 )v(fjg)1 + bj
(1 )v(fig)
1
= (bj   bi) (1 )1 v(fig):
Hence, bi = bj for all i; j 2 Z: Take 2 such that bi = 2 for all i 2 Z:
Now, homogeneity in vectors (a; b) of linear potential values implies that one
may divide both 1 and 2 by 1 and subsequently substituting  = 21 in
Denition 15 yields the mathematical reformulation  a;b; = Sh2
1
whenever
ai = 1 2 nf0g and bi = 2 2 nf0g for all i 2 Z:
Proof of Proposition 8: For  = 1; HM-consistency follows immediately
as  a;b;1 = .
We now prove the part for  = 0: Let (N; v) 2 G: For U  N satisfying
jU j = jN j 1; the proposition follows immediately. Now x U  N satisfying
0 6= jU j < jN j   1: To prove the proposition for  = 0; we show
P a;b;0(N; v) = P a;b;0

NnU; vU; a;b;0

+
Q
k2NnU
bk
ak
P a;b;0(U; v): (2)
We do this by induction on the cardinality of nonempty subsets S of NnU .
Note that for all N  Z; and ; 6= U  N , we have
P a;b;0(N; v) =
v(N) Pk2U  a;b;0k (N;v)+Pk2NnU bkPa;b;0(Nnfkg;v)P
k2NnU ak
:
Hence, taking i 2 NnU; we have
P a;b;0(fig [ U; v) = v(fig[U) 
P
k2U  
a;b;0
k (fig[U;v)+biPa;b;0(U;v)
ai
= v
U; a;b;0 (fig)
ai
+ biaiP
a;b;0(U; v)
= P a;b;0

fig; vU; a;b;0

+ biaiP
a;b;0(U; v):
Let S  NnU; jSj  2; and assume for all D  S :
P a;b;0(D [ U; v) = P a;b;0

D; vU; 
a;b;0

+
Q
i2D
bi
ai
P a;b;0(U; v): (3)
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Then,
P a;b;0(S [ U; v) = v(S[U) 
P
k2U  
a;b;0(S[U;v)+Pk2S bkPa;b;0((S[U)nfkg;v)P
k2S ak
=
vU; 
a;b;0
(S)+
P
k2S bkP
a;b;0((S[U)nfkg;v)P
k2S ak
=
vU; 
a;b;0
(S)+
P
k2S bkP
a;b;0

Snfkg;vU; a;b;0

P
k2S ak
+P
k2S bk
hQ
i2Snfkg
bi
ai
Pa;b;0(U;v)
i
P
k2S ak
= P a;b;0

S; vU; 
a;b;0

+
P
k2S bk
hQ
i2Snfkg
bi
ai
Pa;b;0(U;v)
i
P
k2S ak
= P a;b;0

S; vU; 
a;b;0

+
P
k2S ak
hQ
i2S
bi
ai
Pa;b;0(U;v)
i
P
k2S ak
= P a;b;0

S; vU; 
a;b;0

+
Q
i2S
bi
ai
P a;b;0(U; v):
the second equality follows from Def. 10, the third one follows from (3).
Now, let k 2 NnU; then by denition of  a;b;0 applied to the game (N; v)
 a;b;0k (N; v)
= akP
a;b;0(N; v)  bkP a;b;0(Nnfkg; v)
= akP
a;b;0

NnU; vU; a;b;0

  bkP a;b;0

Nn(U [ fkg); vU; a;b;0

+
ak
hQ
i2NnU
bi
ai
P a;b;0(U; v)
i
  bk
hQ
i2Nn(U[fkg)
bi
ai
P a;b;0(U; v)
i
=  a;b;0k

NnU; vU; a;b;0

+h Q
i2NnU biQ
i2Nn(U[fkg) ai
 
Q
i2NnU biQ
i2Nn(U[fkg) ai
i
P a;b;0(U; v)
=  a;b;0k

NnU; vU; a;b;0

:
The second equality follows from (3), the third one follows by denition of
the value  a;b;0 applied to the game

NnU; vU; a;b;0

:
Proof of Proposition 9: The part (ii) implies (i) is conrmed easily
by writing out the equations for two-person games. We now prove that
(i) implies (ii). Let  6= 1 and let  a;b; satisfy -standardness. Then,
apply  a;b; to the two-person game (fi; jg; v) : Because P a;b; (?; v) = 0,
P a;b; (fig; v) = (1 )v(fig)ai , P a;b; (fjg; v) =
(1 )v(fjg)
aj
and
P a;b; (fi; jg; v) = (1 )v(fi;jg)+biPa;b;(fjg;v)+bjPa;b;(fig;v)ai+aj ;
it follows that
 a;b;i (fi; jg; v) = ai (1 )v(fi;jg)+biP
a;b;(fjg;v)+bjPa;b;(fig;v)
ai+aj
 biP a;b; (fjg; v) + v(fi;jg)2 :
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As -standardness implies  a;b;i (fi; jg; v) = v(fi;jg)+(1 )v(fig) (1 )v(fjg)2
and isolating parts depending on v(fi; jg) we obtain
ai
ai+aj
(1  ) v(fi; jg) + 2 v(fi; jg) = 12v(fi; jg):
This in turn implies aiai+aj (1  ) v(fi; jg) = 12 (1  ) v(fi; jg): As (fi; jg; v)
was chosen arbitrarily and  6= 1; we may conclude ai = aj for all i; j 2 Z:
Let  denote the real number satisfying ai =  for all i 2 Z: Then,
substituting  and isolating those parts depending on v(fig); we obtain:

+ bj
(1 )v(fig)
 =
(1 )v(fig)
2 :
Since (fi; jg; v) was chosen arbitrarily and  6= 1, bj =  1 1  for all j 2 Z:
Finally, isolating the part depending on v(fjg) and substituting the real
numbers obtained yields that the following equation must hold:h

+   1
i
 1 1 P
a;b; (fjg; v) =   (1 )2 v(fjg):
This in turn implies that it must hold that
0 =  12 1 1 P a;b; (fjg; v) + (1 )2 v(fjg)
=  12 1 1  (1 )v(fjg) + (1 )2 v(fjg)
=   (1 )2  (1 )1  v(fjg) + (1 )2 v(fjg) = 0:
Since the latter did not yield a contradiction this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10 : Part (ii) implies (i): Straightforward. (i)
implies (ii): Observe that for all (N; v); T  N; P a;b;(Nnfkg; cuT ) = 0
for all k 2 T; as (Nnfkg; cuT ) is a zero-game. So we obtain  a;b;k (N; cuT ) =
akP
a;b;(N; cuT )+
c
jN j : Let i; j 2 Z; clearly  a;b;i (fi; jg; v0) =  a;b;j (fi; jg; v0)
= 0; and (fi; jg; ufi;jg) = (fi; jg; v0 + ufi;jg): By equal coalitional improve-
ment  a;b;i (fi; jg; ufi;jg)   a;b;j (fi; jg; ufi;jg) = 0; hence,
aiP
a;b;(fi; jg; ufi;jg) + jN j = ajP a;b;(fi; jg; ufi;jg) + jN j
which proves ai = aj :
(iii) is equivalent to (i): Observe that for (N; v) 2 G, and nonempty
U  N;
vU; 
a;b;; = vU; 
a;b;0
+ 
hP
k2U  
a;b;0
k (N; v)  jU jjN jv(N)
i
uNnU :
Let  =2 f0; 1g; let ; 6= U  N , then for i 2 NnU
 a;b;0i

NnU; vU; a;b;0;

=  a;b;0i

NnU; vU; a;b;0 + 
hP
k2U  
a;b;0
k (N; v)  jU jjN jv(N)
i
uNnU

=  a;b;0i (N; v) + 
hP
k2U  
a;b;0
k (N; v)  jU jjN jv(N)
i
 a;b;0i
 
NnU; uNnU

:
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The second equality follows from linearity, and from HM-consistency of  a;b;0
applied to the rst part between the brackets. Furthermore,
i

NnU; vU; a;b;;

= i(N; v)  (1  )
hP
k2U  
a;b;0
k (N;v)  jUjjNjv(N)
i
jNnU j :
It is now a matter of calculation to nd that  a;b;i

NnU; vU; a;b;;

=
 a;b;i (N; v) if and only if  
a;b;0
i
 
NnU; uNnU

= 1jNnU j : The latter holds if
and only if  a;b;0 (and hence,  a;b;) satises equal coalitional improvement.
Proof of Proposition 12: Lemma 6 implies that for all (N; v) 2 G,
'1 
1 
(N; v) = '

N; v 1 
1 

: By Prop. 4, ' is characterized by -consist-
ency and -standardness, or by Sobolev-consistency and -standardness.
So, -consistency and Sobolev-consistency of '1 
1 
are immediate and -
standard-ness follows by writing out -standardness for a 2-player 1 1  -
discounted game.
Proof of Proposition 13: Clearly, 'w;01 (N; v) = '
w (N; v1 ) for all
games (N; v) : Since 'w is uniquely determined by HM-consistency and
w-proportionality, this implies that 'w;01  is uniquely determined by HM-
consistency and (w; )-proportionality.
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